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IS THE SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTE
OVERWORKED? EXPANDED USE OF MAGISTRATESAN ALTERNATIVE TO EXHAUSTION

Forty-two U.S.C. Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for persons whose civil rights have been violated under color of state law. 1
Although passed in 1871, section 1983 was used infrequently until the
civil rights movement of the 1960's. The expansion of the fourteenth
amendment in that decade increased the use and effectiveness of section 1983 as a remedy for deprivation of civil rights. 2 In addition, the
Supreme Court's actions, such as holding that section 1983 does not
require exhaustion of state remedies, 3 spurred the growth of the remedy.
Since the 1960's, the number of claims based on the statute has grown
substantially. Justice Powell recently warned that this growth has imposed a ''heavy burden on the federal courts to the detriment of all
federal court litigants .... '" The caseload problem may lead federal
judges to adopt unsystematic devices to control their dockets, possibly
resulting in the disintegration of a principled and unified approach to
the enforcement of civil rights.
Part I of this Note discusses the history and purpose of section 1983
and identifies the danger unmanaged growth of 1983 suits poses to
civil rights. Part II examines several judicial responses to the 1983
caseload problem and concludes that congressional action is more appropriate. Parts III and IV explore two areas of possible legislative
action. Part III questions the efficacy of a legislatively imposed requirement that the claimant exhaust state administrative remedies as
a prerequisite to a 1983 suit in federal court. Part IV proposes an alternative congressional response to the 1983 caseload problem: a carefully tailored use of the existing magistracy apparatus. The Note concludes that magistrates can handle many of the issues in 1983 suits
that strain judicial resources, and no other measure, short of a substantial increase in the number of federal judges, can effectively manage

1. Section 1983 extends liability to "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
2. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending sixth amendment's right
to counsel to state criminal proceedings); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (extending
eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to state criminal proceedings).
3. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
4. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 533 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the 1983 caseload problem, while at the same time preserving section
1983's central purpose of providing a federal forum to civil rights
litigants.
I.

CuRRENT STATUS OF SECTION 1983

Congress enacted section 1983 during the post-Civil War Reconstruction era. Recalcitrant southern states had passed "black codes" that
largely ignored the liberated status of blacks. Local authorities did not
discourage the activities of groups like the Ku Klux Klan. In 1871, President Grant exhorted Congress to pass legislation that would bring this
conduct under control. Congress responded by enacting the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. 5 Once passed, however, the statute was not often used
until the advent of the civil rights movement in the 1960's. The modem
status of section 1983 had its genesis in a 1961 case, Monroe v. Pape. 6
Although there is some debate today over just how broadly Monroe
should be read, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patsy v. Board
of Regents' seems to hold in no uncertain terms that there is no exhaustion requirement for section 1983 claims.
The primary purpose of section 1983 is to protect fourteenth amendment guarantees. It does so by "throw[ing] open the doors of the United
States courts" to those wronged under color of state law. 8 In opening
these doors, "Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the rela5. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. V 1981)).
.
6. 365 U.S. 157 (1961). Monroe ushered in the new era of § 1983. The case involved an
action by a black man whose home had been invaded by 13 Chicago police officers in the middle
of the night .. The man and his family were rousted from their beds and forced to stand nude
in the living room for several hours. In allowing the plaintiff's 1983 claim, the Court held that:
"The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought
and refused before the federal are invoked." Id. at 181. Since Monroe, § 1983 cases have been
exempt from the traditional rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies before a litigant is entitled to judicial relief. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.01 (1958); McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969). A series of cases after Monroe illustrated the Supreme
Court's adherence to the no-exhaustion rul~.. for 1983 cases. In McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1%3), the Court explicitly extended the Monroe rule to state administrative remedies;
see also Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). Throughout the period leading up to Patsy
v. Board of Regents, the courts generally adhered to the Monroe no-exhaustion rule. As caseload
pressures began to build, however, certain courts began to fashion flexible exhaustion requirements.
See Patsy v. Florida Int') Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (1981) (holding that adequate and appropriate
state administrative remedies must be exhausted), rev'd sub nom Patsy v. Board of Regents,
457 U.S. 496 (1982); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978) (requiring prisoner to exhaust his state administrative remedies as a prerequisite to § 1983); Canton v. Spokane School
Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1974) (requiring exhaustion of adequate administrative remedies).
In Patsy, the Court settled any doubts about the status of the no-exhaustion rule, holding that
a court may not impose an exhaustion requirement for§ 1983 claims. See generally Developments
in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. ll33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
7. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
8. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1971).
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tionship between the States and the Nation with regard to the protection of federally protected rights. " 9 At its core, then, the purpose of
section 1983 is to allow civil rights litigants the untrammeled choice
whether to bring claims initially in federal court or before state tribunals.
This untrammeled choice, however, has resulted in a strong preference
by civil rights litigants for federal courts as the forum of first resort
for pressing their claims. 10 As a result, the number of civil rights claims
has risen dramatically in the past two decades. When Monroe came
down in 1961, only 296 private civil rights actions were brought in
federal district courts. 11 By 1972, with the widespread use of section
1983 in civil rights actions, 6,133 nonprisoner claims were filed. 12 By
1983, that number had grown to 18,406 13 • This increase shows no sign
of reversal. In fact, after Maine v. Thiboutot 14 held that denial of any
right guaranteed by a federally mandated statute involving federal-state
participation may violate section 1983, one commentator noted that
1983 actions can arise in thousands of different state and local agencies that jointly administer federal programs. 1 '
To adjust to the increasingly unmanageable caseload, courts have
begun to adopt expedient means of clearing their dockets of civil rights
cases. 16 For instance, some of these courts have recently attempted to
limit section 1983's scope by invoking concepts of federalism and comity,
expanding the doctrine of abstention, and narrowing the protections
afforded by the fourteenth amendment. Others have foreclosed section 1983 actions on the basis of supplementary statutory remedies. 11
As a result of this judicial activity, the present scope of 1983 is unclear .
•
This lack of clarity, combined with the growing 1983 caseload problem,
9. Id. ·
10. The incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, and the
publicity attending the civil rights movement caused an increase in the popular awareness of
the protections afforded by the Constitution.
11. DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, printed in 1972-73
REPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF U.S. 115 (1973).
12. Id.
13. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS & REPORTS DivisION, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS A-9 (for the 12 months ending Sept. 30, 1983; these statistics
state the number of civil rights claims, not the number of§ 1983 claims). Additionally, the magnitude
of the problem is also demonstrated by noting that as of March 31, 1982, there were 19,911 such
private civil rights cases pending. By March 1983, 24,137 cases were pending. Id. at A-13.
14. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
15. Kupfer, Restructuring the Monroe Doctrine: Current Litigation Under Section 1983, 9
HAsTINos CONST. L.Q. 463, 477 n.77 (1982). Justice Powell, in his Thiboutot dissent, stated that
"[t]he Court's opinion does not consider the nature or scope of the litigation it has authorized."
448 U.S. at 22.
16. Cf. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 25 (1980) ("[l)ndividual judges,
as a matter of self-preservation may begin to read complaints in a grudging manner and to look
for narrow resolutions that avoid the most difficult issues.").
17. See Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1192-95 nn.9-11,
1203 (1977); see also Kupfer, supra note 15, at 465 n.8.
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has led some members of the Supreme Court to suggest that the principles underlying section 1983 should be reconsidered, 18 even though
Congress has expressed no intent to limit the coverage of 1983. 19
II.

JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON SECTION

1983

Since 1971, the Supreme Court has alternately expanded and restricted
the scope of section 1983. 20 Decisions restricting section 1983 have invoked three concepts: "Our Federalism," a narrow concept of the fourteenth amendment, and the primacy of statute-based rights. 21

A.

"Our Federalism,,

In Younger v. Harris22 the Supreme Court announced a concept called
"Our Federalism," 23 described as a system in which the federal govem18. Two members of the Court have recently linked the growing number of § 1983 actions
to the desirability of revising the section. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 555 n.13 (1981)
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion stated that because of increasing § 1983 litigation and
"the inability of courts to identify principles that can be applied consistently, perhaps the time
has come for a revision of this century-old statute . . . that would clarify its scope while preserving its historical function of protecting individual rights from unlawful state action." Similarly,
in a recent law review article, then Judge, now Justice, O'Connor asserted that "[i]n view of
the great caseload increase in the federal courts . . . one would think that congressional action
might be taken to limit [the] use of the section 1983 [remedy]." O'Connor, Tren<fs in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge,
22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801, 810 (1981). For a critical treatment of this position, see Kupfer,
supra note 15.
19. In I 980, Congress passed a statute requiring that state prisoners exhaust state grievance
mechanisms as a prerequisite to litigation of§ 1983 claims in federal courts. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
(Supp. V 1981). Even though fully apprised of the 1983 caseload problem, see Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 509 (1982), Congress declined to impose an exhaustion requirement
on nonprisoner claims. Indeed, there was some reluctance to adopt an exhaustion requirement
even for prisoner cases. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1979) (statement by Rep. Kastenmaier). Congress's
failure to take affirmative steps to redefine or restrict § 1983, especially in light of the growing
caseload burden, suggests that Congress has no intention of retreating from the broad coverage
of 1983.
20. See generally Kupfer, supra note 15, at 463 ("[E]ach term in different contexts the court
provokes the question: To what extent will opportunities to pursue initial relief for deprivation
of constitutional rights continue to be available in the federal courts?").
21. There are other means of restricting§ 1983. The eleventh amendment, giving states sovereign
immunity in federal courts, has been invoked in civil rights cases. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974). Certain immunities have been recognized as barring§ 1983 claims. See, e.g., Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (recognizing absolute immunity for state prosecutors acting
within the scope of their official discretion); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (recognizing good faith immunity for state hospital officials); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)
(recognizing good faith immunity for school officials). Access to federal courts has also been
limited by the increase of procedural burdens to litigants in class action claims. See, e.g., Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (holding that notice in class action for damages
must be sent at plaintiff's expense to all reasonably identifiable class members).
22. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
23. Id. at 44.
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ment "will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the
States." 24 The Younger. Court invoked.this concept to reverse a district
court that, before and during state prosecutions under a criminal syndicalism statute, had ruled the syndicalism statute void for vagueness
and overbreadth. Nonetheless, subsequent cases cited Younger's "Our
Federalism" concept for the broad purpose of limiting the general scope
of section 1983. 2 '
The Court began expanding Younger abstention in Huffman v.
Pursue. 26 In Huffman, the Supreme Court held that the rationale of
the Younger doctrine mandated the exhaustion of state appellate
remedies in civil nuisance actions. 21 In 1975, the Supreme Court further extended the reach of Younger abstention in Hicks v. Miranda. 28
In Hicks, the Court applied abstention to a 1983 suit, even though
no state proceedings had commenced at the time the suit was filed.
The Court extended the concept of pendency beyond Huffman's appellate exhaustion requirement, holding that "the principles of Younger
should apply in full force where state criminal proceedings have begun,
but no proceedings on the substance of the merits have taken place
in the Federal court. " 29 Recent cases have even further extended
24. Id. Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper explain that the doctrine "teaches that federal
courts must refrain from hearing constitutional challenges to state action under certain circumstances
in which federal action is regarded as an improper intrusion on the right of a state to enforce
its laws in its own courts." C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4251, at 533 (1978). For an extended discussion of Younger and its progeny, see Soifer
& Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1141 (1977).
25. See Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 529,617 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the extension
of Younger could "drastically undercut[] Monroe v. Pape[, 365 U.S. 167 (1%1)) and its numerous
progeny."); see also generally, Soifer & Macgill, supra note 24; Note, Applying the Doctrine
of Younger v. Harris to State Administrative Proceedings: Federal Rights Further Jeopardized,
8 Omo N.U.L. REv. 126 (1981). For remarks warning of two long-run dangers, see P. BATOR,
P. MISHKIN, 0. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 283
(2d ed. Supp. 1981) ("The generalized language of 'comity and federalism' which fills the opinions in the Younger line is, however, vague and suggestive enough to create a danger that Younger
will be transmitted into an all-purpose discretionary device for limiting federal jurisdiction.")
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER); Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 841 (1972).
26. 420 U.S.- 592 (1975). Two commentators have described Huffman as "Our Federalism's"
"great leap forward." Soifer & Macgill, supra note 24, at 1173.
27. Justice Rehnquist in Huffman said that "[t]he component of Younger which rests upon
the threat to our federal system is thus applicable to a civil proceeding ... quite as much as
it is to a criminal proceeding." 420 U.S. at 604.
28. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
29. Id. at 349; see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (holding injunctions
against state proceeding barred by Younger when criminal summons filed only days after federal
complaint and "federal litigation was in an embryonic state"). But see Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908). Two other cases demonstrate the gradual elimination of the original
Younger pendency requirement. In Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), the Supreme-Court extended Younger to reach a civil proceeding and bar a§ 1983 suit alleging the unconstitutionality
of a state contempt statute.
The court had two reasons for applying Younger. First, comity demanded that the federal
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Younger's "Our Federalism" to section 1983 damage actions, 30 and
to such nonjudicial settings as activities of state executive officials 31
and state administrative agencies. 32 Thus, courts have invoked the
originally narrow Younger doctrine in order to restrict the traditionally expansive scope of section 1983.
B. Limiting Protected Interests Within the
Fourteenth Amendment
Another judicial doctrine with potential for limiting the access of
section 1983 claimants to federal court arises from a line of cases restrictively construing the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
court not intervene in state contempt proceedings because they lie "at the core of a state's judicial
system." 430 U.S. at 33S. Second, the Court ruled that the§ 1983 plaintiffs had had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings and were therefore barred by Younger
abstention. 430 U.S. at 337.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), decided the following term, may represent the
Court's furthest extension of Younger in civil proceedings. See Soifer & Macgill, supra note 24,
at 1209. In Trainor, the Court, applying Younger and Huffman, held that a writ of attachment
that had been issued by a clerk of court rendered a suit "pending" for Younger purposes and
precluded federal intervention.
These cases are important for three reasons: First, these cases collectively suggest that a state
proceeding is pending, for the purposes of Younger, if there is any act by an agent of a state
court; second, the Juidice notion that the availability of an opportunity to raise federal claims
in a state forum is a permanent part of "Our Federalism," a result which may be irreconcilable
with Monroe v. Pape; third, after Trainor, "Our Federalism" may reach any civil proceeding,
possibly restraining a number of § 1983 civil rights claims.
30. See Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976). Martin involved a§ 1983 damage action against a state prosecutor in which the court said it would "offend the principle of comity
for a district court to inquire into plaintiffs' ability to secure a fair trial in a pending state prosecution." Id. at 194-9S.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that Younger bars damages in § 1983
cases, in Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary, 4S4 U.S. 100 (1981), it did hold that comity
barred state taxpayers' § 1983 suit seeking damages for the alleged unconstitutional administration of the state tax system. In dicta, the Court noted the "Our Federalism" concept. Id. at 179.
31. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Rizzo involved a§ 1983 class action on behalf
of the citizens of Philadelphia against the mayor and police commissioner, alleging a pattern
of unconstitutional police mistreatment of minorities. On appeal from a trial court order that
the Philadelphia police department comply with existing statutory duties of supervision of its
officers, the Supreme Court reversed, asserting that the principles of federalism blocked federal
injunctions not only against state proceedings, but against state executive officials as well. Rizzo's
expansive treatment of "Our Federalism", and its failure to analyze Younger in terms of its
rationale rather than its rhetoric, has led one commentator to conclude that it establishes a rule
capable of "an unacceptable degree of destruction" to civil rights. Weinberg, supra note 17,
at 1194-9S.
32. See Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Ed., 662 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1981) (invoking Younger
to bar a § 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief against a tenure termination proceeding in a.state
administrative tribunal); McCune v. Frank, S21 F.2d I 152 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that the existence of an ongoing state administrative proceeding triggers Younger abstention); Grandco Corp.
v. Rochford, 536 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1976) (barring § 1983 suit because of pending state administrative proceeding to revoke a license). See generally Note, supra note 25; Note, Supreme
Court Extends Younger Comity Doctrine, 46 FORDHAM L. -REV. 176 (1977).
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For example, in Paul v. Davis, 33 the Supreme Court barred a 1983 claim
for damages to remedy an injury to a plaintiff's reputation and privacy.
The Court held that the plaintiff had not been deprived of any "liberty" or "property" rights secured against state deprivation by the due
process clause, and that state tort law provided an adequate remedy. 34
Similarly, in Parrott v. Taylor,3' the Supreme Court held that negligent
deprivation of property could be remedied under section 1983, but barred
the claim because state law remedies satisfied the fourteenth amendment's due process requirement. 36 Thus, Paul and Parrott together stand
for the proposition that state action does not deprive a claimant
due process in a way section 1983 can redress until the claimant has
exhausted state remedies and can prove the violation of a specific constitutional right. 37 In effect, Paul and Parrott substitute procedural for
substantive due process. 38 By giving the fourteenth amendment this
33. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
34. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court distinguished Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961) on the basis that in Monroe the complaint had pointed to a specific constitutional guarantee
that had been violated. In Paul, the Court .said the complaint pointed to no such guarantee.
"Rather," the Court stated, "[the plaintiff) apparently believes that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause should ex proprio vigore extend him a right to be free of injury
wherever the State may be characterized as a tortfeasor." Paul v. Davis, 242 U.S 693, 701 (1976).
The Court's distinction fails to raise this point in relation to the complainant's allegation that
he was denied a constitutional right of privacy arising from the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and
fourteenth amendments. Id. at 712.
Two fundamental difficulties are presented by the Paul decision. First, the Court made no
attempt to delineate precisely which interests would rise to the level of "liberty" or "property."
In view of the growth in § 1983 caseload, this failure leaves trial judges, who may be operating
under great caseload pressures, a substantial power to curtail§ 1983 by narrowly defining "liberty"
and ''property.'' Nonetheless, courts have not yet expanded the Paul rationale beyond the holding
that defamation does not involve "liberty" or "property" rights. See Ray v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 677 F.2d 818, 824 (11th Cir. 1982); Bradford v. Bronner, 665 F.2d 680, 682 (5th Cir.
1982); Margoles v. Tormey, 643 F.2d 1292, 1297 (7th Cir. 1981). The second difficulty presented
by Paul is that the existence of a cognizable constitutional right may tum on whether state tort
law provides adequate compensation for an injured interest.
35. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Parratt involved the negligent loss by prison guards of a $23.50
model kit the plaintiff had sent for from a mail-order company.
36. Id. at 544.
37. Id. at 542 (citing Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 932 (1978)). The Court in Parrott also pointed to Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977),
which held that common law standards were sufficient to protect a school child's eighth amendment interests in receiving corporal punishment. Thus, there is a strong argument that Parrott,
though on its face restricting the scope of§ 1983, actually may restrict the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Writing about Parratt, one commentator, in part commenting on Paul, 424
U.S. 693 (1976), said: "[T)he cases are capable of broader mischief .... They are capable of
generating doctrine and results that are inconsistent with the long-standing conceptions about
the meaning of 'liberty' and 'property' . . . . " Monaghan, 0/ "Liberty" and "Property," 62
CORNELL L. REv. 405, 443-44 (1977).
38. An example of what the Parrott decision may mean in future cases is provided by Sheppard v. Moore, 514 F. Supp. 1372 (M.D.N.C. 1981), in which the court, relying on Parrott,
dismissed a§ 1983 claim alleging an unconstitutional intentional deprivation of plaintiff's property by county officials following a criminal investigation.
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scope, and by setting a standard states may meet by providing any
kind of tort remedy, judges may be able to control their dockets by
manipulating the concepts of "liberty" and "property. " 39
C.

Limitation of the Section 1983 Remedy for
Violation of Statute-Based Rights

In Maine v. Thiboutot, 40 the Supreme Court broadly interpreted section 1983 to extend its protection to violations of rights created by any
federal statute. The Court held that by remedying the deprivation "of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws," section 1983 could remedy government violation of any federal
law. 41 Since Thiboutot, however, the Supreme Court has decided two
cases that undermine this expanded approach to the protection of
statutory rights under section 1983. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman, 42 the Court held that the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 43 created no enforceable rights on
behalf of the developmentally disabled, and suggested on remand that
the Act's fund termination clause might provide an exclusive remedy
that would preclude a section 1983 suit. 44 Similarly, in Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 45 the Court
held that two antisewage statutes precluded an action based on section
1983. 46

Thus, subsequent cases have limited - and almost eliminated Thiboutot's protection of federal statutory rights under section 1983.
Although the plain meaning of section 1983, as recognized in Thiboutot,
established the availability of the remedy for all statutory violations,
subsequent decisions have recognized exceptions only when it appears
the statute violated provides an exclusive remedy or when the statute
violated did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities. 47
These exceptions give a wider berth to judicial discretion for docket
control in section 1983 suits.

39. See generally Monaghan, supra note 37.
40. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
41. Id. at 4-8. The Court held the "and laws" clause of § 1983 to mean all federal laws.
42. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 6000 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
44. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1981).
45. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
46. Before Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), this would not have been a question, because
the "llQd laws" language had not been taken to comprehend federal statute-based rights.
41. See Middlesex, 453 U.S. I, 19-21; Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981). The Middlesex majority classified the two exceptions, originating in Pennhurst, as "(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether the statute
at issue was the kind that created enforceable 'rights' under § 1983." 453 U.S. at 19.
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The Need for Congressional Action

The burgeoning section 1983 caseload, and the potential for abuse
of the new doctrines of limitation, argue the need for congressional
action. Indeed, both legislators and courts have urged Congress to act. 48
Congressional inaction may lead federal judges, facing an unmanageable
docket of 1983 cases, to invoke these doctrines out of a sense of
self-preservation. 49 Nevertheless, "[t]he solution to crowded dockets
should not be careless judicial redefinition of a constitutional
standard. " 50 Thus, the relevant question regarding the section 1983 problem is not whether Congress should act, but rather what form its action should take.
Ill.

A

CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED EXIJAUSTION REQUIREMENT

Congress could attempt to solve the section 1983 caseload problem
by statutorily requiring the exhaustion of state administrative remedies
as a prerequisite for federal court jurisdiction over 1983 claims. Indeed, section 1997e, 51 the exhaustion requirement for prisoner claims
under section 1983, could serve as a model for a nonprisoner section
1983 exhaustion requirement. But such a requirement could prove an
unworkable and inappropriate solution to the 1983 caseload problem.

A.

Section 1997e - A Model for a General Section 1983
Exhaustion Requirement

Section 1997e dictates that state prisoners, in order to bring section
1983 claims, must first exhaust the remedies available through their

state's prison grievance system. The section, however, requires exhaustion only if the Attorney General of the United States has certified
the grievance system as being "in compliance with . . . minimum acceptable standards [of due process] according to criteria set forth in
48. In Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513-17 (1982), the Court urged Congress
to act. Even before the decision, two members of the Court testified before a congressional
budget committee, suggesting that Congress impose a state administrative exhaustion requirement. 2 Justices' Budget Testimony Seen as Hint to Key Decision, N.Y. Times, Mar. IO; 1982,
at B8, col. 4. In criminal cases, Congress has passed a statutory requirement that state prisoners
exhaust federally approved state prison remedies before bringing § 1983 claims if the trial court
finds that the requirement serves the interests of justice in the particular case. 42 U .S.C. § l 997e
(Supp. V 1981).
49. See supra notes 15-16; see also Weinberg, supra note 17, at 1203 ("It is difficult to resist
the conclusion that much of this federal door closing is not so much a function of enlightened
federalism or even an evolving political environment as of crowded dockets.").
.
SO. See Kupfer, supra note IS, at 473; see also id. at 464 ("Development of new restrictions
on the availability and applicability of the section 1983 remedy may be a response to this [caseload)
pressure.").
SI. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp. V 1981).
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the statute." 52 Congress believed that section 1997e would encourage
states to develop better internal prison grievance procedures 53 to resolve
disputes finally and fairly.
Congress could fashion a similar exhaustion requirement and certification method of non prisoner claims under section 1983. 54 Because
nonprisoner 1983 claims reflect a wider range of possible issues than
the narrow category of prison grievances, a general certification
mechanism would have to contain additional criteria different from
those applicable to section 1997e. 55 Moreover, the volume of claims
would require standards for a large number of state agencies, rather
than for a single state grievance system.

B.

Difficulties With a Statutory Exhaustion Requirement

1. Federalism and an exhaustion scheme- Although a section 1983
exhaustion requirement may seem in accordance with the notions of
52. Under§ 1997e(2), the following minimum standards are established: (a) an advisory role
for employees or inmates in system formulation, implementation, and operation, (b) time limits
for replies to written grievances, (c) priority processing of emergency grievances, (d) safeguards
against reprisals, and (e) independent review of grievance resolution. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (Supp.
V 1981).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979); 124 CONG. REc. 11,974 (1978) ("[Section 1997e) would encourage states to develop meaningful grievance procedures . . . . "); id. at
11,982 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id. at 15,441 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmaier); Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); see also infra note 63.
54. It seems unlikely that a nonprisoner § 1983 exhaustion scheme would differ greatly from
§ 1997e. Section 1997e guarantees a high level of protection by requiring certification of the
grievance system that prisoners must exhaust. Congress would probably not extend a lower level
of protection to nonprisoners. As one commentator said, "Can it seriously be said that policy
dictates the exhaustion of any state remedy as an improvement over immediate access to federal
courts? Congress has determined a comprehensive scheme for cases involving certain prisoners;
only such a carefully tailored scheme would suffice were an exhaustion requirement [for nonprisoners) imposed." Kupfer, supra note 15, at 477 & n.79 (arguing that legislative history surrounding the enactment of§ 1997e suggests the care and determination Congress applied in drafting the limited exhaustion requirement for prisoners).
55. Congress could formulate two types of exhaustion requirement standards for§ 1983 cases:
(l) a broad, unitary standard against which all state agencies could be judged, or (2) a multiplicity of standards reflecting the diversity of state agencies. As a starting point for a unitary standard, Congress might follow the lower court's majority opinion in Patsy, 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.
1981). In Patsy, the court stated that exhaustion of state administrative remedies could be required only if certain minimum conditions had been met. Among these conditions were an orderly system of review of agency decisions and the availability of interim relief. On the latter point,
for instance, the federal district court could retain jurisdiction while the agency deliberates, thereby
ensuring the protection of the federal right at issue. Section 1997e similarly allows the court
to continue the case for 90 days while the agency acts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997d(a). Nonetheless,
the effective operation of such an exhaustion requirement depends on the extent to which it
induces states to bring their administrative procedures in line with federal criteria. Without certification there can be no exhaustion. Thus, unless a substantial number of state agencies are
certified, something for which there is no guarantee, the exhaustion requirement would exist
only on paper, and the § 1983 problem would remain unresolved.
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federalism and comity, 56 such a requirement might not, after all, lessen
federal-state tensions. An unintended benefit of unimpeded access
to federal courts in civil rights cases is that federal courts are not put
in a position of superior authority over state courts and agencies; the
states and the federal judiciary operate in separate spheres. Requiring
litigants to channel claims first through state administrative agencies,
and then in essence allowing federal courts to review state agency decisions would end this separation. First, section 1983 litigants receiving
adverse dispositions at the state agency level would take the claim directly
to federal court, requiring the federal court to sit in judgment on a
decision rendered by a state agency. The federal courts would thus
act as overseers of state agencies, not a result calculated to reduce
federal-state tensions. Second, the same federalism concerns urging the
exhaustion of state agencies could well lead to development of a rule
requiring the exhaustion of state judicial remedies as well. 57 Such a
rule could, in many instances, require federal courts to monitor state
courts, 58 again, not a situation liable to lessen federal-state tensions.
2. Delays inherent in an exhaustion requirement- An exhaustion
requirement would delay access to federal court, 59 and thereby

56. See Patsy, 634 F.2d at 912; Patsy, 457 U.S. 496,533 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Note,
Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 CoLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1206-07
(1968). See generally Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 557.
Sl. Developments, supra note 6, at 1266 ("Of course, to the extent that the calls for administrative exhaustion are predicated on concerns for federalism and the workload of the federal
courts, the arguments ineluctably shade into arguments for judicial exhaustion as well.").
58. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). After Thiboutot, many § 1983 claims
may involve rights springing from joint federal-state programs, enabled by federal legislation
and administered by state agencies. Because these rights are federal in· nature, even though overseen by states, it can be strongly argued that the interests of federalism - the proper division
of function between the federal and state governments - is better served by allowing federal
courts to hear 1983 claims without state interference.
59. See, e.g., Kupfer, supra note 15, at 476 n.72 (In Patsy, claimant's case might have been
delayed up to a year had she followed each step of the procedure set forth in the appendix
of the en bane lower court opinion, 634 F.2d at 927-28.); see also Note, supra note 56, at 1207.
("Even without conscious state efforts to frustrate the assertion of unpopular rights by
requiring recourse to dilatory remedial procedures - and an exhaustion rule does open the door
to such efforts - the inevitable consequence of insistence on exhaustion is substantial delay
in vindication of the constitutional rights of the complainants."). The delay inherent in an exhaustion scheme would contravene the policy that the very nature of the rights protected under
§ 1983 warrants their adjudication in federal courts - particularly when constitutional rights
are at issue. Indeed, few tasks better lend themselves to federal adjudication than the protection
of federal rights. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in § 1983 Actions,
50 U. CIN. L. REv. 594, 612-13 (1981) (casting doubt on arguments favoring a first hearing at
the state level). Another commentator has observed that the federal forum results in an atmosphere
more receptive to constitutional rulings against the excesses of state officials. See Kupfer, supra
note 15, at 467. One commentator has argued that the provision of a federal forum presents
sufficient justification for § 1983. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105
(1977); Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
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discourage or preclude section 1983 claims. 60 Such delays would be particularly threatening to the rights of indigent litigants, who can ill afford the costs of protracted litigation. Moreover, a state administrative
exhaustion requirement could encourage individual adjustments or
settlements, 61 at the expense of more significant conclusions of law.
The rules of the agency would not fall subject to external scrutiny,
and "others who, because of fear, ignorance, or lack of resources,
fail to mount challenges of their own, [would] continue to be governed by a rule of questionable constitutionality. " 62
3. The uncertain economics of an exhaustion requirement and the
problem of disparate access to federal courts- An administrative exhaustion requirement assumes that the imposition of definite standards
and the creation of a certification mechanism will induce states to bring
their administrative procedures in line with statutory criteria. 63 Nevertheless, uniform and universal - or even widespread - certification
may not be achievable. 64
An exhaustion requirement may induce some states to certify, while
it may prove insufficient inducement to others. For example, one state's
agencies may address so few cases that the state does not consider it
worthwhile, in terms of autonomy, to spend the money necessary to
secure and maintain certification of its agencies. 65 Other states hearing
the same number of claims may attach a higher value to autonomy.
REv. 725 (1981). But see Monaghan, supra note 37. For a general discussion favoring the federal
forum as more appropriate for the vindication of federal rights, see H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL Vmw 90 (1973); Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83
HARV. L. REv. 1352 (1970); Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the
Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 943-44 (1979).
60. See Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84,
101 (1967) (state statutes or regulations may "create pressures ... analogous to the 'chilling
effects' of strictures upon first amendment rights").
61. See Note, supra note 60, at 104.
62. Id.
63. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 911 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub·nom. Patsy
v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) ("Prompted by appropriate judicial decisions, the
state administrative agency will have the incentive and be able to hone its procedures to comply
with federal requirements, both procedural and substantive, without losing the advantage of the
agency's expertise .... "). Without this incentive to improve their procedures, states might choose
not to certify their agencies, as would be required by an exhaustion scheme. Yet, if there were
no certification, federal courts could not order exhaustion. Thus, widespread noncertification
could greatly limit the practical effect of an exhaustion requirement on the§ 1983 caseload problem.
64. Indeed, the closest experience with a similar exhaustion requirement, § 1997e, indicates
that states' responses in this regard have been disappointing. By the time of the Patsy opinion,
not one state inmate grievance procedure had been certified by the Department of Justice. See
Patsy, 457 U.S. 496, 535 n.21 (1982) (Powell, J ., dissenting). Thus, in the more than two years
since the enactment of § 1997e (March 30, 1980) no state has taken action to bring its prison
grievance system into line with federal statutory standards. Thee is no a priori reason to believe
a similar scheme for nonprisoner claims will fare any better.
65. One objection to this argument is that the costs of certifying an agency may be very
low. There are two responses to this. First, though costs of paper procedu~ may be low, there
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This uneven inducement to certify could result in a situation in which
litigants from some states would have direct access to federal court,
while litigants from other states would be denied such access.
Unequal access to federal courts could hinder the effectiveness of
an exhaustion requirement for several reasons. First, disparity. in access to federal courts could produce inequalities between the litigation
times of those litigants who do and those who do not have to exhaust
state remedies. This would subject litigants who have to exhaust state
remedies to long delays before a federal. hearing. This additional litigation time might discourage claimants who must exhaust state remedies.
Second, an exhaustion requirement could create an economic bias against
complainants. From a fiscal standpoint, a state would want its agencies to dispose of claims if agency damage awards to litigants were
smaller, on the average, than federal court awards on the same cases.
Thus, states may harbor an economic bias against civil rights litigants
that federal courts do not.
4. Inability of Congress to formulate an adequate exhaustion
standard- The formulation of an exhaustion plan for nonprisoner section 1983 cases might prove unworkably complex. The variety of agencies and of factual circumstances of the cases would require that Congress promulgate a general standard, leaving the details to be filled
in by the certifying authority. Such an alternative would give the certifying authority broad discretion to decide which agency procedures
the claimant must exhaust. The vagueness of a general standard, and
the wide variety of agencies to which it would have to be applied, could
lead to litigation concerning the correct application of the standard.
Moreover, federal court evaluations of state procedures would bog the
courts down in a morass of largely unguided procedural litigation. This
would impose the problems of standard-setting upon the courts,
something Congress has explicitly sought to avoid. 66
5. Effect of an exhaustion requirement on federal policies encouraging litigation- Further complications in enacting an exhaustion statute
derive from the existence of secondary federal policies embodied in
statutes designed to encourage civil rights litigation. For example, secare potentially dozens of agencies in any given state. Each will need to establish and maintain
a procedure that meets federal criteria in order to receive certification. Second, while a state
may prove willing to incur the costs of creating a paper procedure eligible for certification, it
may not prove willing to incur the costs necessary to ensure that state practice meets those standards.
66. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 514 n.18 (1982). One argument that states
might advocate in favor of an exhaustion requirement would involve the creation of a centralized
super-agency mechanism, which could handle all administrative disputes in the state. There are
several problems with this approach. First, Congress would have to depend on the states to create
such a mechanism. It is unclear whether federal legislation could mandate the creation of such
a mechanism. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833. (1976). Second, a superagency of this sort would flatly contradict the argument that agency expertise primarily justifies
agency exhaustion.
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tion 1988 grants federal courts the discretion to allow the prevailing
party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of costs. 67 That statute attempts to create an incentive for the private enforcement of civil rights
and especially to encourage those litigants who, because of their indigency, might not otherwise be inclined to vindicate their rights. 68 No
analogous general policy exists at the state level. 69 As a result, some
claimants might not pursue their claims because of the unavailability
of favorable attorney's fee statutes at the state level. Thus, Congress,
in deciding whether to enact an exhaustion requirement, must decide
whether to limit this important policy of encouraging civil rights
litigation.
Similarly, in determining whether to enact an exhaustion requirement, Congress must also consider the availability of class actions at
the federal level. 7 ° Claimants generally cannot obtain class certification when pursuing an action before an administrative agency. 11 Thus,
an exhaustion requirement could hamper the class action as a device
to encourage civil rights litigation. 72
Of course, even if the litigant must first exhaust administrative
remedies, once the litigant reaches federal court both attorney's fees
and class action status become available. Many litigants, however, might
pursue their actions only if these resources are available at the start
of the action. Thus, an exhaustion requirement could deter many civil
rights litigants from bringing their claims. 73
IV.

A

SYSTEM OF SECTION

1983

MAGISTRATES

As a solution for the section 1983 caseload problem, an expanded
use of the federal magistrate system provides a superior alternative to
67. 42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1976).
68. Maher v. Gayne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Staten v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh, 638
F.2d S99 (3d Cir. 1980); Seattle School Dist. No. I v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980);
Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1980); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1979); see also S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908; H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976). See generally Comment, Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions Under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1978, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 332 (1980); Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fee Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1980).
69. See Kupfer, supra note 15, at 468. Nebraska is unusual in providing for attorney's fees
for state administrative procedures. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,226 (Supp. 1980).
70. See United States ex rel. Sero v. Prieser, 372 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (class actions
may be appropriate under § 1983); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
71. See Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, S20 F.2d II (3d Cir. 1975).
72. See Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (recognizing a general rule encouraging liberal construction of civil rights class actions); Arkansas Educ. Ass'n. v. Board of
Educ., 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971) (upholding class of twenty).
73. An exhaustion requirement could also preclude punitive damages in § 1983 suits, see
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 n.11 (1978), because state administrative procedures generally
do not allow for punitive damages.
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an exhaustion requirement. Magistrates are currently empowered to
serve as adjuncts to federal district courts, and they provide a readily
available and very flexible response to section 1983 caseload pressures.
A scheme of 1983 magistrates would allow Congress to address the
1983 problem while leaving the core meaning of the statute intact. 74

A.

Mechanics of the Proposal

The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 (FMA) could form the basis
for a system of special section 1983 magistrates. 75 The FMA provides
that magistrates will serve as subordinate adjuncts to article III judges
in district courts. Traditionally, magistrates have filled the role that
masters once filled, acting as fact finders, rather than as decison
makers. 76 In 1972, however, amendments to the FMA expanded traditional duties of fact finding" and recommendation, 78 empowering
magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings, 79 to rule on nondispositive
pretrial matters, 80 and, with the consent of the parties, to conduct hearings in which the magistrate may render binding judgments reviewable
by a court of appeals. 81 The legislative history of the FMA and the
1979 amendments suggests that the magistrate system primarily seeks
to "assist judges in handling an ever-increasing caseload." 82 This same
· philosophy could be applied to the section 1983 caseload.

74. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9. There are indications that Congress has delayed
addressing the § 1983 problem precisely because of its fear that any action it takes will adversely
affect the vindication of civil rights through § 1983. As evidenced from its recent enactment
of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text, Congress recognizes the
problems of crowded dockets and growth in the number of § 1983 cases. Had Congress· been
inclined to enact a similar provision for nonprisoner cases it could have done so at that time.
-"Congress failure to redefine § 1983, given the available statistics on the federal caseload, [indicates] that it is Congress' intention to keep the remedy intact." See Kupfer, supra note 15, at 473-74.
75. Federal magistrates are governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-636 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). For
a comprehensive analysis of the FMA and recent amendments, see McCabe, The Federal Magistrate
Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEOIS. 343 (1979).
76. See generally Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part I: The English Model, SO N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1070 (1975); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates.,Part II: The American Analogue, SO
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1297 (1975).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
78. Id.
79. Id. The 1976 amendment to this section rejected the Supreme Court decision in Wingo
v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1973), which held it was improper for a magistrate to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on a prisoner's petition for federal habeas corpus; see also McCabe, supra
note 75, at 354.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A) (1976).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(l) (Supp. V 1981). See Munich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979)
(holding consensual reference not unconstitutional where district court retained jurisdiction over
the litigation by exercising supervisory powers in the form of de novo review and by invoking
exclusive authority to enter final judgment).
82. S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 1469,
1470.
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Under this proposal, a section 1983 magistrate would serve in much
the same capacity as an ordinary magistrate. The section 1983 magistrate
would retain the power to find facts and recommend dispositions, provided that parties could request a de novo review of case-determinative
matters. Nevertheless, a more extensive use of magistrates in 1983 cases
must not detract from a continued high level of civil rights enforcement. Thus, a system of special magistrates could only provide an acceptable solution to the 1983 problem if Congress modifies some of
the present provisions of the FMA to reflect heightened concern for
civil rights enforcement. These modifications should restrict the discretionary power of federal judges in the use of section 1983 magistrates,
thereby promoting uniformity in the use of section 1983 magistrates
and avoiding unequal treatment of litigants. 83
1. De novo review of pretrial matters- The first modification of
the FMA would allow federal judges to retain the power of de novo
review of any pretrial determination made by a magistrate. Currently,
a district judge may consider a determination by a magistrate of any
pretrial matter if the appealing party can show that the magistrate's
order is "clearly erroneous and contrary to law. " 84 Some courts have
therefore refused to exercise de novo review over magisterial determinations of pretrial matters. ss
In enacting this section of the FMA, Congress determined that the
time saved by allowing magistrates to hear preliminary matters and
enter "final" dispositions on those matters, subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard of review, outweighed the costs to litigants of not
having all phases of the legal proceeding decided by an article III judge.
Thus, a modification allowing judges to exercise de novo review over
pretrial determinations by a 1983 magistrate .might seem inconsistent
with congressional intent. Nevertheless, as the legislative history indicates, section 636 of the FMA concerns a general category of civil
cases and does not contemplate a magisterial system focusing specifically
on sensitive issues of civil rights. Congress's interest in according civil
rights the greatest degree of protection suggests that the balance between a savings of time and the cost to litigants of limiting de novo
review should tip in favor of the latter under a scheme of 1983
83. Indeed, the possibility of unequal treatment constitutes a major drawback of an exhaustion requirement. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A) (1976).
85. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (holding that a district court's authority
to refuse to consider anew a suppression motion that a magistrate recommended be denied is
within his sound judicial discretion); Merritt v. International Bhd.of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d
1013 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding pretrial orders of magistrate not subject to de novo determination);
United States v. Marshall, 609 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Miller, 609 F.2d 336
(8th Cir. 1979) (both holding that the district judge need not conduct a de novo hearing in reviewing
a pretrial matter).
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magistrates. Under the present proposal, then, federal judges would
retain the right to review de novo any pretrial determination made by
a magistrate
2. Assignment of new duties- A related change in the FMA would
eliminate a judge's general discretion to assign to magistrates additional duties not inconsistent with the Constitution. 86 Although experimentatiori with the duties assigned magistrates might allow federal
judges to operate more efficiently, such additional discretion might
also allow judges to respond to increased caseload pressures by experimentally expanding the scope of the duties of their section 1983
magistrates. Experimentation of this sort would undermine the policy
that Congress, and not overworked judges acting out of a sense of
self-preservation, 87 should provide a remedy for the swollen 1983
caseload.
3. Consensual reference- A third modification would consist of
closing the consensual reference option provided by the.1979 amendments to the FMA. Under those amendments, a magistrate may, with
consent of the parties and on an order of the judge, conduct "any
or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry
of judgment in the case." 88 Although such a procedure allows speedier
disposition, 89 it might cast the magistrate in the role of a "poor man's"
judge. 9 ° Consensual. reference _puts poorer litigants in the position of
having to decide whether or not to "purchase" an article III judge
with the extra time and money required to wait for one.
Moreover, the option of consensual reference lends itself to abuse.
By threatep.ing delay or extensive discovery, defendants may coerce
litigants into consenting to submit their cases to magistrates.9 1 Although
Congress condemned such coercive tactics, 92 it did not enact any provision to safeguard against their use. Congress's endorsement of con-

86. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976) ("A magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as
are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.").
87. See Whitman, supra note 16.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(l) (Supp. V 1981).
89. S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 1469, 1481.
90. See H.R. REP. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1978) (dissenting view of the Hon.
Elizabeth Holtzman); Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship/Magistrate Reform Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; id. at 62-63, 122-24
(Rep. Dorinan); id. at 54-55 (statement of Thomas Ehrlich); H.R. REP. No. 1364, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 542 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman) ("It is unlikely that a litigant will hold out
for an article III judge when he or she is poor or denied bail or is suing for badly needed money.").
See generally Note, Article Ill Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction for Federal
Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023 (1979).
91. See Note, supra note 90 at 1052.
92. See Hearings, supra note 90, at 14.
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sensual reference may be appropriate in the context of the general run
of civil cases. In light of the special status of civil rights, however,
the potential for abuse of the consensual reference option dictates its
elimination in the context of 1983 magistrates.
4. Screening cases-Despite the efficiency of allowing magistrates
to handle all technical and routine matters, some cases may present
constitutional or statutory questions of such importance that they warrant the exclusive attention of a federal judge. A screening mechanism
must isolate such cases before they go to the magistrate. Under this
proposal, the federal judge would screen incoming cases and .decide
which ones to submit to the 1983 magistrate. 93 Because section 1983
primarily seeks to protect important constitutional and statutory rights,
no case should be referred to a magistrate that presents a novel· or
undecided constitutional question, or a claim that would require a
thorough interpretation of an important statutory right.
B.

Evaluation of the Proposal

1. Advantages- A system of 1983 magistrates could respond to
the varying caseload problems across the federal districts. 94 Such a

93. Requiring the judge to screen cases might seem to thwart the labor-saving objective of
a magistrate system. But the time saved by allowing the magistrate to find facts and deal with
other relatively routine matters in the majority of cases would far outweigh the time spent in
a preliminary scan of incoming § 1983 complaints. Indeed, available evidence suggests that a
screening process combined with task division has this positive effect. Although not directly
analogous to the proposal at hand, one study found that the creation of intermediate appellate
courts at the state level, with discretion to screen appeals left in the state supreme courts, resulted
in longer, more thoroughly researched supreme court opinions. Lower courts were reversed more
often and the courts tended to decide more constitutional issues. See Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REv. 961 (1978). Moreover,
the screening process can be streamlined to distribute the burden of screening among judges.
Enlarging judges' professional staffs might also ease the burden. The California Court of Appeals, for example, was successful when it created a central staff to prepare memoranda and
draft per curiam opinions, assigning the screening function to the staff director under criteria
fixed by the judges. See Meador, Appellate Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L.
REv. 255, 270 (1975).
94. It is likely that not all states experience the same civil rights caseload pressures. It is
probable that some areas are subject to great caseload pressures, while others are not. For instance, there has been disparate growth patterns of total civil and criminal filings in the period
1976 to 1981. In 1981, the Eastern District of Kentucky experienced a 48.80/o decline in total filings during the period. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED
STATES COURTS 1980, at 80. The Northern District of California, on the other hand, saw a 46.1 OJo
rise in total filings over the same period. Id. at 116. The Northern District of New York witnessed
an 83.1 OJo rise, id. at 28, while the Southern District of West Virginia experienced a 38.31170 drop.
Id. at 48. See generally id. Of course, these numbers do not directly reflect the growth pattern
of§ 1981 cases over this period, but it would seem a reasonable conclusion that § 1983 filings
may follow a similar pattern. The likely disparity in growth and concomitant § 1983 caseload
pressures is important to the success of an exhaustion requirement because the presence or absence
of caseload pressures may determine whether a state chooses to certify its agencies.
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system would meet the caseload problem only where and to the extent
it exists. Conversely, a statutory exhaustion requirement would apply
overinclusively to all areas, regardless of local conditions. An added
benefit of this approach is that the use of magistrates could grow with
the increase in the number of 1983 cases.
The proposal for an expanded use of the existing magistracy apparatus also has certain political and financial advantages over the creation of federal judgeships. First, the creation of federal judgeships is
a costly process, more than twice as expensive as the creation of a
new magistracy position. 95 A budget-conscious Congress may postpone
the creation of needed judgeships, even at the expense of continued
caseload strain on the federal judiciary. 96 Second, the creation of federal
judgeships introduces complex political factors, and may not lend itself
to solving the immediate problem of the burgeoning 1983 caseload. 97
Third, the creation of federal judgeships inevitably lags behind the actual needs of the judicial system. 98 As a result, in the interim period
judges may be forced to adopt expedient docket clearing techniques
that may or may not prove desirable in the long term. The flexibility
of the magistrates scheme avoids this problem.
2. Potential objections to a section 1983 magistrate schemea. The article III decision maker- Critics of a section 1983
magistrates scheme might argue that it unconstitutionally delegates
judicial power to magistrates who do not enjoy article III tenure and
salary privileges. 99 This argument is largely disposed of by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Construction Co. ' 00 In Marathon, the Court struck
down the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 101 because Congress failed
to limit the Act's broad grant of jurisdiction to non-article III bankruptcy judges in such a way that the "essential attributes" of judicial
power remained in an article III decision maker. 102 But Marathon does

95. In 1977, cost figures revealed that the creation of the average federal district judgeship
cost, in its first year, $308,000, and thereafter $225,000 per year. The cost for a magistrate is
less than half that for a judge: $145,000 the first year, and $112,000 per year thereafter. See
McCabe, supra note 75, at 382; see also Hearings, supra note 90, at 498.
· 96. See Note, supra note 90, at 1049; Kaufman, The Judicial Crisis, Court Delay and the
Para-Judge, 54 JUDICATURE 145, 147-48 (1970).
97. The creation of federal judgeships is attended by great "jousting, visibility and political
oversight." See Note, supra note 90, at 1048.
98. S. REP. No. 117, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1977).
99. U.S. CONST. art III,§ 1, grants life tenure to federal judges, with removal only according
to the impeachment standard in article II, § 4. See, e.g., O'Donoghue v. United States, 289
U.S. 516, 529-30 (1933).
100. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
102. The Court discussed five essential attributes of judicial power: (1) that the scope of
determination be narrow; (2) that the court retain a measure of jurisdiction over the matter at hand;
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not preclude a scheme for section 1983 magistrates if an article III judge
remains the ultimate decision maker. The scheme would confine the
magistrate's function to elaborating a factual record, writing a report,
and filing a recommendation upon which the article III judge would
then render a decision.
Moreover, from a nonconstitutional point of view, the same policy
concerns weighing against a more extensive use of magistrates weigh
even more heavily against an exhaustion requirement, which would involve state agency officials, themselves non-article III decision makers.
Indeed, unlike the present proposal, under which a magistrate merely
finds facts and recommends dispositions, an exhaustion scheme would
require state agency officials to dispose of cases, without any initial
accountability to a federal judge.
b. Disparate treatment- Critics might also object to the section
1983 magistrates scheme because it may lead to a disparity of treatment between litigants whose cases are heard initially by magistrates
and those whose cases are reserved for judges. But an exhaustion requirement could also result in disparate treatment. The magistrates proposal, however, enjoys two advantages over an exhaustion requirement
in this respect. First, because uniform national standards could carefully
define the relationship between judges and magistrates, litigants would
not suffer a significant level of disparate treatment. In contrast, an
exhaustion scheme would impose disparate treatment upon litigants,
because some would have direct access to federal courts while others
would have to exhaust local remedies. Furthermore, a federal judge
could monitor the actions of a magistrate, whereas, under an exhaustion requirement, review of an agency decision entails the filing of a
separate case, a further delay, and the problem of federal court deference
to state agency decisions.
Critics of a system of section 1983 magistrates might also contend
that such· a system will lead judges to cope with rising caseload pressures
by delegating ever greater powers to their magistrates. Nonetheless,
the instant proposal minimizes judicial discretion concerning the use
of magistrates: a judge cannot experimentally assign additional duties, 103
the proposal precludes the consensual reference option, 104 and the section 1983 magistrate has no power of decision on case-dispositive

(3) that orders by the bankruptcy court (or magistrate under this proposal) be enforceable only
on order of a district court; (4) that findings made by the adjunct court (or magistrate) be set
aside if "not supported by the evidence"; (5) that the adjunct court not issue final judgments
that are binding and enforceable even in the absence of an appeal. The instant proposal, which
carefully restricts the power of the 1983 magistrate, meets all of these criteria.
103. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
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matters. 105 Thus, all of the avenues by which a judge might expand
the use of section 1983 magistrates have been blocked.
CONCLUSION

Unmanaged, the great number of section 1983 claims threatens that
statute's continued effectiveness as a guarantor of federal court access
for civil rights litigants. In an effort to exercise control over the growing number of 1983 claims, the Supreme Court has developed several
doctrines that may severely restrict the scope of section 1983. Some
members of the judiciary have urged Congress to pass a state administrative exhaustion requirement as a solution to the 1983 caseload
problem. Neither of these two "solutions" is acceptable.
courts
should not limit the scope of an important civil rights statute, and
an exhaustion requirement would probably prove unworkable and
ineffective.
An expanded, though carefully circumscribed, use of the existing
magistracy concept offers a better solution. Such a proposal could create
a flexible and workable response to the 1983 caseload problem while
minimally impinging on section 1983 as a device designed to ensure
access to federal courts by "throw[ing] open the doors of the United
States courts" 106 to civil rights litigants.

The

-Brian P. Owensby

105.
106.

See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1971).

